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Abstract 
In June 2013 the UK Supreme Court delivered a judgement that applied the European Convention 
on Human Rights to British combat operations which undermined long-standing assumptions about 
the status of combatants in a war zone. While, conventionally, law is deemed to follow on from 
ethics, the invocation of individual rights in this legal case prompts the revisiting of recent just war 
debate over the role of individual rights when making normative judgements about the morality of 
war and ethical conduct therein. The way in which individual rights discourses are deployed in the 
philosophical underpinning of just war theory has a marked impact on how the ethical status of 
combatants and their actions can be assessed. The use of the Reaper by the Royal Air Force on 
remote operations in the Afghanistan theatre adds a further layer of complexity to those ethical 
considerations. Consequently, this article will explore the nexus of remote warfare, just war 
reasoning and individual rights, highlighting the contradictions, opportunities and potential 
implications that arise when making ethical judgements in the domain of war in the twenty-first 
century.  
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Introduction 
 
‘A good man would prefer to be defeated than to defeat injustice by evil means.’1 
Sallust, 41 BC 
 
On 19 June 2013 the UK Supreme Court delivered a judgement that undermined previous rulings 
on, and assumptions about, the status of combatants in a war zone: a concept whose legal and 
moral
2
 antecedents can be traced back through many centuries of the just war tradition. For the first 
time the Human Rights Act (1998), which enshrines the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in UK law, was successfully applied to a case involving the deaths of soldiers on a 
battlefield, a battlefield that lay outwith the geographical confines of the UK and continental 
Europe.  
 The families of three soldiers killed in Iraq when their non-armoured ‘Snatch’ Land Rovers 
were blown up by a roadside bomb, had taken legal action against the Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
on the basis that the MOD had not reasonably taken every step to protect the lives of the soldiers. It 
was argued that the soldiers’ ‘right to life’, as enshrined in Article 2 of the ECHR, had been violated 
by the negligence of the British Army. The key element of the plaintiffs’ argument was that soft-
skinned vehicles should not have been used in a high-risk environment when armoured vehicles 
were available, either already in the British Army’s inventory or available to purchase on the open 
market. In its Judgement the Supreme Court justices explained: ‘The Snatch Land Rover claims …  
are all directed to the substantive obligation, which requires the state not to take life without 
justification and also, by implication, to establish a framework of laws, precautions, procedures and 
means of enforcement which will, to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, protect life.’3 
 In making its judgement the UK Supreme Court held the MOD legally liable for actions that 
had not gone far enough in protecting the lives – and rights – of the soldiers concerned. The court 
specifically rejected the MOD’s claim that there was no case to answer on the basis of combat 
immunity, a claim that manifested itself in two ways. First, that the soldiers were outside the UK’s 
jurisdiction; and second, that the MOD owed no such duty of care at the time of the soldiers’ 
deaths.
4
 The UK Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond responded to the judgements by stating: 
 
                                                             
1 Sallust (86BC - 34BC), Jugurthine War, 41BC, from http://www.quotationspage.com, accessed 7 July 2013. 
2 In this article, the term ‘morality’ refers to rules and codes that are broadly accepted, while ‘ethics’ is about individual 
choices and decision-making: often in relation to those codes.  
3 Supreme Court Judgement, 19 June 2013, ‘Smith, Ellis, Allbutt and Others v The Ministry of Defence’, [2013] UKSC 
41, p. 21, para. 57, http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2012_0249_Judgment.pdf, accessed 26 
June 2013. 
4 Ibid., p. 5. para. 13. 
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I am very concerned at the wider implications of this judgment, which could ultimately 
make it more difficult for our troops to carry out operations and potentially throws open a 
wide range of military decisions to the uncertainty of litigation … It can’t be right that 
troops on operations have to put the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] ahead 
of what is operationally vital to protect our national security.
5
 
 
 The Supreme Court judgement, together with the response of the British Defence Secretary, 
highlights an ever-present – and in a European context in particular, ever growing – tension in the 
international political system as it currently operates, and against which political policies, military 
doctrine, and ethical and legal arguments must be formulated: the rights of individuals versus the 
rights of states. In their respective positions, the Supreme Court prioritised the human rights of 
individuals, while in his opposition to the Court’s judgement the Defence Secretary stressed 
national security and the importance of protecting it, even at additional risk to soldiers’ lives. The 
court’s decision was neither unanimous nor uncontroversial, and the justices acknowledged that the 
matter should be approached with caution, lest they run the risk of undermining the capacity of a 
state to defend itself and its interests.
6
 Further, perhaps dramatically, the judgement stated that 
‘democracy itself may be at risk,’ if a state’s resort to martial force be unreasonably curtailed.7 
 The gravity of the potential consequences of applying individual rights in this way – as 
highlighted by both the Defence Secretary and the Supreme Court itself – is complicated further by 
the proliferation and use of new technologies to deliver lethal force from great distances across 
continents and multiple jurisdictions: especially for the Reaper. While, conventionally, law is 
deemed to follow on from morality, the invocation of individual rights in this legal case prompts the 
revisiting of recent just war debate over the role of individual rights when making normative ethical 
judgements regarding the use of military force. The way in which individual rights discourses are 
used to underpin just war theory has a marked impact on how the moral status of combatants and 
their actions can be assessed. 
Consequently, this article will explore the nexus of remote warfare, just war reasoning and 
individual rights, highlighting contradictions, opportunities and potential implications for making 
ethical assessments in the domain of war. The first section will begin by setting the context of the 
subsequent discussion in actual – as opposed to fictionalised or sensationalised – Reaper operations, 
outlining a number of existing approaches to making moral assessments of RPA or ‘drone’ 
                                                             
5 Philip Hammond, 19 June 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-britain-iraq-court-
idUSBRE95I0QH20130619, accessed 26 June 2013. 
6 Supreme Court Judgement, p. 24, para. 66. 
7 Ibid. 
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activities.
8
 The second section will focus on the use of individual rights in two competing just war 
approaches. Analysis will contrast Michael Walzer’s just war reasoning, which subsumes individual 
rights within the more important rights of states, with Jeff McMahan’s approach, which grants 
prioritises individual moral rights. I will examine the different ways that each uses the notion of 
rights in assessing the moral status of combatants and their actions. The remainder of the article will 
then explore the implications of that moral debate for the domain of remote military operations: for 
the use of Reaper in particular. Underlying this approach is the assumption that war, cultural mores, 
and evolving technologies shape just war reasoning at least as much – and possibly more – than just 
war shapes the clash of martial forces in pursuit of political ends.
9
 
 
‘Easy’ killing and risk-free war 
The Reaper pilot and sensor operator stared intently at the bank of screens in front of them, their 
concentration fixed on one individual. Their target had been identified by more than one 
intelligence source and extended observation had confirmed both his identity and activities as an 
active Taliban combatant. The mission intelligence coordinator continued to actively provide them 
with checks and updates, while at the same time legal sanction to attack the target – within the 
dictates of their rules of engagement – had been granted. The target was also sufficiently isolated to 
ensure that nobody else would be struck by the blast or shrapnel from the impending strike. As the 
selected weapon was about to be released and the target killed, the sensor operator thought he 
glimpsed, fleetingly, what may have been another person encroaching onto the camera’s field of 
vision. Although once again only the target could now be seen on the screen, the sensor operator 
was reluctant to prosecute the target just in case someone, or more than one person, was standing 
just outside of their narrow field of vision – and therefore potentially at risk. A discussion ensued. 
The pilot had not seen anything untoward but the intelligence coordinator was unsure: there might 
have been someone there. The pilot reminded them that they were cleared to fire and that their rules 
of engagement allowed them to do so. Legal sanction was in place. With the crew split over the 
whether or not to proceed with the attack, given even the small possibility of killing or maiming an 
innocent passer-by the pilot agreed with the others to abort the attack. Checks would continue and 
                                                             
8 Sensible debate about remote operations is bedevilled with terminological disputes and caveats. This article will refer 
to remotely piloted aircraft or remotely piloted aircraft systems because these terms accurately encapsulate the element 
of human agency involved in the delivery of lethal force from the air. The use of ‘drone’, and to a lesser extent 
‘unmanned aerial vehicle’, is a frequent ploy in public discourse about Reaper operations, which obscures – either 
deliberately or accidentally – the high degree of human involvement in every part of the process. 
9 For an extensive defence of this statement see Peter Lee, A Genealogy of the Ethical Subject in the Just War Tradition, 
PhD Thesis, submitted to King’s College London, 2010. 
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another suitable opportunity to strike the target – without the potential risk to an innocent bystander 
– would be sought.1011 
 This incident raises a number of practical and moral questions: On what basis is the Reaper 
(or Predator or other armed remotely piloted aircraft) crew permitted to take the life of a fellow 
human being? What moral status is held by the enemy combatants involved, both the targets on the 
ground and the combatants operating the Reaper? In addition, what makes an individual liable, or 
not, to attack by deadly military force? These questions have been and continue to be subject to 
numerous enquiries by academics and practitioners alike. In the incident outlined above, legal 
authority had been granted for the strike and the crew involved would have been protected from 
prosecution if they complied with their rules of engagement (ROE) and unintended collateral 
damage – the wounding or death of a noncombatant – had occurred. Contrary to popular 
mythology, the crew involved were not itching to pull the trigger in the latest deadly round of ‘war 
by Playstation’; instead, their discussion focused on whether it was ‘right’ – an ethical judgement – 
to release the weapon in that particular situation. 
David Whetham provides a particularly thoughtful overview of moral and political 
challenges raised by the use of remotely piloted aircraft in ‘Killer Drones: The Moral ups and 
Downs’.12 Like most Western commentators setting out to assess the moral implications of 
remotely conducted asymmetric operations against a technologically inferior enemy, Whetham 
draws upon the memes and themes of just war, with familiar notions of jus in bello providing a 
touchstone for his analysis. In this context he introduces but does not explore in depth the moral 
calculus involved in removing physical risk from one group of combatants (Reaper pilots, for 
example).  
In the context of RPA operations, the relationship between physical risk, ubiquity and moral 
legitimacy is recognised, though not explored, in UK defence doctrine.
13
 At a UK parliamentary 
                                                             
10 This incident was recounted to me at length by one of the Royal Air Force crew members involved during a visit to 
Creech Air Force Base on 15 July 2013. The video and audio footage of the incident is now used in the training of new 
Reaper crews to highlight the importance of ethical decision-making and shared crew involvement in the decision-
making process. 
11 Permission was obtained from all Reaper crew quoted directly or indirectly in this article. Further, before submission 
of this article to Air Power Review the personnel cited were given the opportunity to read the manuscript to ensure that 
no-one had been quoted inaccurately or out of context.  
12 David Whetham, ‘Killer Drones: The Moral ups and Downs’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, No. 3 (June/July 2013) pp. 
22–32. 
13 UK Air and Space Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30 (Ministry of Defence), July 2013, pp. 2-8 – 2-9; and 
Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, The UK Approach to Unnmanned Aircraft Systems, Ministry of Defence Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre (March 2011) p. 5-8ff. 
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level, Louisa Brooke-Holland has provided members of parliament with a formal Briefing Note 
which touches slightly upon the ethical and moral implications of the use of remotely piloted 
weapons, and in places repeats – uncritically – assertions made by proponents and opponents 
alike.
14
 For example, she quotes Medea Benjamin, author of Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote 
Control, who has stated: ‘The biggest ethical problem with drones is that it makes killing too 
easy’.15 When allowed to stand alone and unquestioned such a comment is granted greater 
credibility than it deserves in a complex debate. It is particularly disturbing in a document that 
might be the only basis on which some UK MPs will make judgements about the practicality and 
morality of remotely piloted aircraft operations. What does Benjamin mean by ‘easy’? From a 
technological standpoint, killing by Reaper is monumentally difficult. Huge numbers of people – 
again, contrary to urban myth – are needed to remotely deliver lethal ordnance: from software 
engineers to hardware engineers, traditional airframe technicians to communications specialists, 
armourers to logisticians, intelligence coordinators to legal advisors, and so on. Furthermore, 
conventional aircraft such as the Tornado or Typhoon have significantly greater destructive 
potential than the remotely piloted Reaper because of the larger payloads they can carry. Perhaps, 
however, killing by ‘drone’ is meant to be psychologically ‘easy’.  
Such an assumption is shared by Cole et al who state boldly: ‘Operators, rather than seeing 
human beings, perceive mere blips on a screen. The potential for this to lead to a culture of 
convenient killing may well be reason to consider banning this new type of lethal technology’.16 
Minimal evidence and maximal hyperbole is invoked as part of an anti-drone campaign: all without 
direct reference to the experience of the operators involved or any appreciation of the actual level of 
close-up detail that is available to the Reaper crew.
17
 On practical grounds alone such a simplistic 
argument should be rejected: the political and reputational cost to both the UK and the RAF of 
allowing ‘disconnected’ sociopaths to indulge in such so-called ‘easy’ and ‘convenient’ killing 
14 Louisa Brooke-Holland, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones): An Introduction’, Parliamentary Briefing Note (April 
2013), http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06493, accessed 21 May 2013. 
15 Medea Benjamin, quoted in ibid., p. 14. 
16 Chris Cole, Mary Dobbing and Amy Hailwood, Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and the ‘Playstation’ Mentality 
(Fellowship of Reconciliation: Oxford, 2010) p. 4. 
17 Having spoken in numerous public debates and conferences on the themes of the ethics of remotely piloted aircraft 
and the ethos of those involved, the most common – and most illegitimate – form of argument against the use of 
remotely piloted aircraft involves a combination of the following unquestioned assumptions: ‘drones are evil’; ‘drones 
are autonomous’; contradicting the previous point, ‘drone operators are deliberately dehumanized, unthinking killers’; 
‘our assertions must be true or governments would deny them’ (do governments state where their nuclear submarines 
are lurking?). Such inanities belong in the activists’ lexicon and not in academic debate, which is why I do not respond 
to them here. 
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(even ignoring the inconvenient presence of multiple layers of legal and institutional oversight and 
accountability) is beyond calculation. That some individuals can accept such claims without demur 
says more about their credulity than the validity of the claims. In contrast, one Reaper pilot 
describes his experience: 
 
I have killed the enemy from both [conventional aircraft] and from the Reaper. The 
body’s reactions are the same – it surprised me. Your mouth goes dry and the hairs on the 
back of your neck stand up. Everything goes tense and you get that sick feeling in your 
stomach. You know what you are about to do.
18
 
 
Of course, one individual’s account does not constitute empirical evidence of perfect, 
unerring behaviour in every circumstance. However, it will hopefully encourage greater analysis 
and further research, while discouraging the spread of unthinking, uncritical presumptions that often 
seem to be based on little more than a few hours’ experience playing ‘Call of Duty’ on a computer. 
The physical reaction described here does not suggest that killing has become ‘easy’ for the 
person/people involved. And finally on this belaboured point, does ‘easy’ refer to the sheer numbers 
that can be killed? It always seems morally perverse to resort to simple arithmetic when human 
lives, and deaths, are involved. For example, according to the United Nations, ‘as many as 1 million 
people are estimated to have perished’ in Rwanda in the weeks following 6 April 1994.19 They were 
killed using mainly machetes and traditional farming implements. I would not like to speculate how 
psychologically difficult it was to take part in that killing but, technically speaking, it was ‘easy’, 
highly effective in an evil sort of way, and all of the many thousands of weapons involved could 
probably be purchased for less than the price of one precision guided missile. 
Much more nuanced in her analysis of remotely piloted aircraft operations is Alison 
Williams, who critically engages with the ‘spatial practices’ involved and the ‘idea that the bodies 
of the aircrew are becoming less important’.20 In response to the common accusation that remote 
operations are ‘risk-free’ to the crews involved, she goes on to observe: ‘commentators mistakenly 
assume that it is only the physical body that can be damaged by warfare’.21 To a lesser extent, 
James Cook considers the moral implications of separating combatants from combat, arguing that 
                                                             
18 Personal communication by a UK Reaper pilot, 16 July 2013, Creech Air Force Base. 
19 Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml, accessed 12 July 2013. 
20 Alison J. Williams, ‘Enabling persistent presence? Performing the embodied geopolitics 
of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle assemblage’, Political Geography, 30 (2011) p. 381, 387. 
21 Id. 
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the ‘relatively unique status of RPA pilots and cyber operators may well challenge the [just war 
theory]’, especially if those combatants are not adequately separated from civilian populations.22 
While the foregoing, and the rapidly expanding ‘morality of ‘drones’’ oeuvre,23 strives to 
make normative moral assessments of killing at a distance, this paper turns now to a more abstract 
consideration of the philosophical means that make it possible – drawing on just war discourse – to 
even speak of the morality of war in general and Reaper operations in particular. 
 
States, rights and just war  
Since 1977 and the publication of his Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer has provided a 
uniquely influential voice in modern just war theory. Nicholas Rengger goes as far as to described 
Walzer’s magnum opus as ‘unambiguously the most influential academic reconsideration of the 
tradition in recent times’.24 Over the past four decades Walzer’s ideas have been tested, challenged 
and ranked as first among equals alongside those of other just war luminaries such as James Turner 
Johnson and Jean Bethke Elshtain.
25
 Walzer – like Johnson, Elshtain and many others – locates his 
work firmly within the just war tradition and draws upon enduring historical concepts therein in 
order to make judgements about the morality of war in the twenty-first century. Setting his work 
within what he calls a ‘legalist paradigm’,26 Walzer draws upon the notion of individual rights to 
provide a philosophical foundation for his just war theorising. Contrarily, the most concerted and 
sustained challenge to Walzer’s just war theory has come from Jeff McMahan, who argues ‘that 
some of the principles [Walzer] defends do not and cannot derive from the basic moral rights of 
individuals and indeed, in some cases, explicitly permit the violation of those rights’.27 The 
                                                             
22 James Cook, 'Cyberation' and Just War Doctrine: A Response to Randall Dipert’, Journal of Military Ethics, 
Vol. 9, No. 4 (2010) p. 420. 
23 For further related reading see: David Fisher, ‘The Robotisation of War: An End to Military Virtues?’ in Andrew 
Todd (Ed.) Military Chaplaincy in Contention: Chaplains, Churches and the Morality of Conflict (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2013) pp. 83-92; David Whetham, ‘Remote Killing and Drive-By Wars’ in David W. Lovell and Igor Primoratz (Eds), 
Protecting Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2012), pp. 199-214; Patrick Lin, ‘Ethical Blowback from Emerging Technologies’, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, 
No. 4 (2010) pp. 313-331; Peter W. Singer, ‘The Ethics of Killer Applications: Why Is It So Hard To Talk About 
Morality When It Comes to New Military Technology?’ Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2010) pp. 299-312. 
24 Nicholas Rengger, 'On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty–First Century', International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 
(2002) p. 355. 
25 Helpful introductions to their works include: James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Theory (New York and London: New 
York University Press, 1992). 
26 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Third Edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000) p. 61. 
27 Jeff McMahan, 'The Sources and Status of Just War Principles', Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2007) p. 91. 
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remainder of this section will explore key points of difference between these two distinct 
approaches to making moral assessments concerning war, before going on to explore their 
significance for RPA operations in the final section. 
 While Walzer relies on individual rights as a key foundation on which to base his just war 
theorizing, those rights are set in the context of, or subordinated to, state rights: with the origins and 
the nature of the relationship between the two left largely undefined in his Just and Unjust Wars. He 
writes of the relationship between the two (individual rights and state rights):  
 
Individual rights (to life and liberty) underlie the most important judgements that we make 
about war. How these rights themselves are founded I cannot try to explain here. It is enough 
to say that they are somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to be a human being. If 
they are not natural, then we have invented them, but natural or invented, they are a palpable 
feature of our moral world. States’ rights are simply their collective form.28 
 
It appears, superficially, that Walzer grants primacy to individual rights when making 
judgements about the morality of war. However, the relationship between individual and state rights 
is insufficiently defined to confidently support such an assumption. If his just war theory somehow 
rests on individual rights, the relationship between those rights and waging war is mediated by the 
state: state rights therefore being granted priority over the individual rights.
 29
 He writes of the 
relationship between the two: ‘The rights of states rest on the consent of their members. But this is 
consent of a special sort. State rights are not constituted through a series of transfers from individual 
men and women to the sovereign or through a series of exchanges among individuals.’30  
 Lackey makes a bold, if over-simplified, assessment of the place of personal rights in 
Walzer’s schema, noting, ‘Walzer’s theory is no simple affirmation of personal rights against the 
encroachment of the general interest: the whole of his theory of just wars hinges on the notions of 
the rights of nation-states, not individuals’.31 It is clear from Walzer’s words above that individual 
rights play a significant role in his just war theory. In addition, Brian Orend is critical of Walzer’s 
lack of detail at this point, noting, ‘It is ironic that so much weight is put on human rights in 
Walzer’s just war theory yet so little is said either about their nature or their justification’.32  
                                                             
28 Walzer, 2000, p. 54. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Lackey, 1982, p.536 (my italics). 
32 Brian Orend, 'Michael Walzer on Resorting to Force', Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep 
2000) p. 528. 
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Perhaps Orend does not go far enough in his criticism here. Not only does Walzer avoid explaining 
or justifying how he forms the basis of his rights argument, he appears at best apathetic and at worst 
ambivalent about how these rights come to be. Walzer has no intention of debating the benefits of 
natural law, or any other philosophical
33
 basis for his rights-oriented arguments. It therefore appears 
that his pragmatism is more concerned with the application of these rights within his system than 
with explaining how they exist in the first place: his conception of rights being an assumed, rather 
than a defined, moral source.
34
  Consider some words of Walzer on the relationship between politics 
and philosophy concerning the validation of individual rights: 
 
philosophical validation and political authorization are two entirely different things. They 
belong to two entirely distinct spheres of human activity. Authorization is the work of 
citizens governing themselves among themselves. Validation is the work of the philosopher 
reasoning alone in a world he inhabits alone or fills with the products of his own 
speculations.
35
 
 
Walzer appears unwilling to resolve any tension between the nature of rights and their 
origins. In effect he has bracketed, or set aside, questions concerning the theoretical basis of his 
rights approach to just war, concentrating instead on the application of his just war theory with 
practical examples: typically prioritising the role of states. While this has enabled him to address the 
practicalities of his just war arguments, the lack of clarity over the relationship between individual 
and state rights – as the basis for his just war arguments – would later present problems when 
challenged by McMahan’s more individual rights-focused argument. Furthermore, they highlight a 
limitation of his theorising when it is applied to the kind of military interventions that have occurred 
since the end of the Cold War: specifically, when one protagonist is a sub-state entity. Despite the 
foregoing, Walzer’s commitment to the state in his political and just war writings is not that of a 
blinkered idealist, rather it comes with demands and expectations, especially in the legitimate use of 
force in self-defence: He writes: 
 
The moral standing of any particular state depends on the reality of the common life it 
protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly 
                                                             
33 The term ‘ontological’ may well be a more technically precise alternative to ‘philosophical’. 
34 Were this paper to afford the luxury of further investigation of this point, the foundational assumptions of liberal 
democracy would probably be a good place to start exploring. 
35 Walzer, M., ‘Philosophy and Democracy’ in Political Theory, Vol.9, No.3 (Aug 1981) p. 397. 
11 
 
accepted and thought worthwhile. If no common life exists, or if the state doesn’t defend the 
common life that does exist, its own defense may have no moral justification.
36
 
 
Though these words were originally written in 1977 they include a prescient definition, even 
if not intended at the time, of what is commonly referred to today as a failed state. If we take a strict 
reading of Walzer’s description here, Afghanistan still fails to meet the criteria – at least in moral 
terms – of a fully functioning state. For all of the monumental efforts and sacrifices made by UK 
and NATO military personnel, only a fool or a blinkered optimist would begin to claim that some 
credible form of common life exists in Afghanistan in 2013, and that it is being adequately 
defended by the Afghan police, army and government. While Walzer does not set out to define or 
specify how the rights of states are constituted, he makes it clear that these rights are, to some extent 
at least, related to or dependent upon the rights, and common life, of  the individuals who make up 
that state. It is in this context that his political and theoretical priority lies with the rights of the 
state. Against this backdrop Walzer’s just war theory is located primarily in a ‘global community 
[that] is pluralist in character, a community of nations, not of humanity, and the rights within it have 
been minimal and largely negative, designed to protect the integrity of nations and to regulate their 
commercial and military transactions.’37 
 McMahan’s sustained critique of Walzer’s just war concentrates primarily on the 
paradoxical status of individual rights and state rights. Although he does not expound the 
relationship between the two kinds of rights, Walzer repeatedly confirms that they both exist and 
support his just war theory. McMahan, however, opts for a highly selective reading of Walzer’s 
prioritisation of state rights, using the domestic analogy
38
 to attribute claims to Walzer that Walzer 
does not claim for himself. McMahan states: ‘If we conduct our thinking about war by focusing on 
relations among states and treating states as if they were individuals with rights that are analogues 
of the rights of persons, the actual rights of actual persons become essentially invisible’.39 Going 
further he adds: ‘If we take the domestic analogy seriously, it should lead us to treat individual 
persons as if they had no more significance in relations between states than a person’s individual 
                                                             
36 Walzer, 2000, p.54. 
37 Michael Walzer, 'The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 9, 
No. 3 (Spring 1980) p. 226. 
38 A philosophical approach that attributes the characteristics of an individual to a state. For example, equating an 
individual’s right to elf-defence to a state’s right to self defence. A number of logical progressions can then be argued 
based on the initial assumptions. 
39 McMahan, J., 'The Sources and Status of Just War Principles', Journal of Military Ethics, Vol.6, No.2 (2007) p. 96. 
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cells have in relations between persons’.40 Put more simply – perhaps too simply – for McMahan, 
Walzer’s prioritising of the rights of states makes individuals rights redundant, or at least 
insignificant. 
 McMahan produces a sequence of logical steps in this argument, each of which makes sense 
when viewed on its own terms. However, the intellectual sleight of hand comes in the assumptions 
that underpin McMahan’s approach where he implies that the domestic analogy, as he presents it, is 
somehow representative of Walzer’s position when the reality is significantly different. Over many 
years Walzer has consistently sought to retain the tension between individual rights and human 
rights in his work, even if he has not defined the relationship at length. McMahan, however, claims 
that Walzer has consistently ignored the rights of individuals in his just war theorising. Taking his 
argument to its logical conclusion, McMahan considers that where a state ‘has acted in such a way 
as to forfeit its right against attack, and if all its citizens are equally part of the state, then it seems 
that they should all be legitimate targets of attack.’41 He somehow suggests that Walzer’s just war 
theory eventually, through a series of logical leaps, takes us to a position where within an aggressor 
state there is no difference between combatant and noncombatant, innocent and non-innocent – 
however those terms are defined – they are subject to legitimate attack. However, the only way he 
can make that argument is by omitting, entirely, Walzer’s repeated acknowledgements that 
individual rights and state rights are somehow interdependent. McMahan’s ultimate claim that the 
domestic analogy has led to ‘collective responsibility, collective guilt, collective liability, and 
collective punishment’ would be more relevant if he provided examples to support his case.42 It 
would also be more impressive if he could demonstrate the presence of such intended outcomes in 
Walzer’s writings in particular, and in the just war tradition more broadly. Significantly, however, 
McMahan’s partial reading of Walzer and his associated selective application of logical 
progressions has an important bearing on the moral status of combatants, and it is to this aspect of 
just war that we now turn. 
 
 
The moral standing of combatants  
Walzer broadly summarises the moral order that enables the conduct of war to be described, 
disputed and justified or otherwise as the ‘war convention’.43  This war convention is made up of 
‘the set of articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and 
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philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgements of military 
conduct’.44  Given the diversity of sources Walzer calls upon, his war convention should be 
understood more as a loose coalition of ideas that frame his moral arguments than a coherent, 
succinct theory. He goes on to describe the war convention as having been ‘expounded, debated, 
criticized, and revised over a period of many centuries. Yet it remains one of the more imperfect of 
human artefacts: recognizably something that men have made, but not something that they have 
made freely or well’.45 The strength of Walzer’s admittedly ambiguous approach is that it leaves 
scope for reinterpretation as time and circumstance changes. In that regard his contribution to the 
just war tradition is in keeping with his many predecessors. The weakness of his approach is that it 
remains vulnerable to a focused and sustained critique – such as that carried out by McMahan. 
Crucial in Walzer’s theorising, and a dominant assumption within the just war tradition for 
centuries, is viewing enemy combatants, regardless of whether they fight either as part of an 
aggressive army in an unjust war, or as part of an army acting justly in self-defence, as moral 
equals. This moral equality rests, in Walzer’s just war theory, on the ability to distinguish between 
categories of people – combatants and noncombatants. For Walzer, noncombatants are part of a 
broader category he refers to as ‘innocent people’ who, because they pose no direct threat to their 
enemies cannot lose their rights (for example, their right to life).
46
 Noncombatants are ‘innocent’ no 
matter how good or evil the decisions of their political leaders with regard to war. Further, 
combatants, at least regular combatants who serve in recognised, state-sanctioned, uniformed 
militaries, lose that presumption of innocence because of the threat that they pose to enemy lives 
during times of war. In addition, for Walzer, combatants gain more rights – such as the right to kill 
under particular conditions – during times of war while simultaneously accepting a reduced right to 
life. 
McMahan challenges the view that soldiers engaged in a just war while defending innocents 
somehow ‘only’ hold moral equivalence to those soldiers whose actions may be contrary and 
unjust: ‘It does not seem that people can forfeit or lose moral rights simply by defending themselves 
and other people from unjust attack’.47 Therefore, for McMahan, soldiers fighting in a just war to 
defend the innocent should not lose any of their individual rights to life. He adds: ‘So unjust 
combatants use wrongful means – the killing of people who are innocent in the relevant sense – to 
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achieve ends that are unjust. It is hard to see how that could be morally permissible’.48 At first 
glance it appears that McMahan makes a valid point – the combatant fighting a just war in a just 
manner must surely be acting ethically, while the combatant fighting an unjust war using wrongful 
means must be acting unethically. Therefore, the rights of those fighting justly should be protected. 
McMahan’s approach certainly appears to anticipate the Supreme Court ruling on the rights of UK 
soldiers outlined at the beginning of this article. 
The key to understanding McMahan’s approach to the moral equality of combatants is to 
recognise that he bases that equality on the application of assumed universal individual moral rights 
– with no consideration of the role of states. His unjust combatant – one who fights in an unjust war 
– violates the rights of the just combatant, so they cannot in any way be considered as moral equals 
in the way that Walzer advocates and which the war convention, broadly understood, accepts. 
Again, McMahan’s capacity for logical progression of argument – within the constraints and 
assumptions that he does not always make clear – is impeccable. However, in basing his own just 
war reasoning on an application of universal moral rights, thereby making combatants responsible 
for making their own judgements about whether or not a war is just and therefore whether or not to 
participate in it, McMahan places an unrealistic expectation upon soldiers, sailors and airmen to 
make moral judgements about the cause for which they are being asked – ordered – to fight. He 
writes that ‘if soldiers lack a just cause, there are no goods that they are justified in pursuing by 
means of war’.49 They therefore act in an unethical way simply by taking up arms when ordered. He 
also argues that where just cause is absent there can be no discrimination, because,  
 
the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets does not coincide with that 
between combatants and noncombatants. Rather, what discrimination requires is that 
soldiers target only those who are morally responsible for an unjust threat or for some other 
grievance that provides a just cause for war.
50
 
 
McMahan’s case here is logical in that one argument follows another. This logical 
progression rests on his assumption that soldiers are fully able to ascertain whether or not the course 
of action they are being asked to pursue is supported by a just cause. Further, they can only use 
force against someone who is morally responsible for an unjust threat. However, the responsibility 
for the existence of an unjust threat is typically held at a much higher level by political leaders. If 
McMahan’s logic is extended where does it stop?  If soldiers are held to be morally blameworthy 
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for engaging in war – despite not having access to all the information held by senior political 
decision-makers – do the civilians who feed those soldiers share in the collective responsibility, 
thereby making themselves liable to collective punishment? 
Walzer’s attitude towards McMahan’s approach to just war might be described as respectful 
scepticism. For Walzer, McMahan’s attribution of moral responsibility to the individual rather than 
the collective (of, say, civilians or soldiers, combatants or innocents) is idealised and unworkable in 
practice. Walzer’s response is based primarily on the impracticality of applying McMahan’s ideas 
to the unpredictable and awkward business of war. Walzer’s lack of a detailed discussion of the 
relationship between individual rights, state rights and the individual’s moral standing in war, 
leaves him open to the charge of prioritising pragmatism and practicality over theory. Conversely, 
McMahan’s perceptive, and in places selective, development of just war ideas based on universal 
individual moral rights leads to eloquent arguments that impress with their logic but often have 
questionable application in a messy world characterised by overlapping political self-interests, 
moral ambiguity and recourse to martial force in less-than-clear circumstances. What cannot be 
ignored, in Europe at least, is that the application of the ECHR to British soldiers in Iraq – a theatre 
of combat operations geographically separated from Europe – changes the social, legal and political 
landscape within which ethical debate surrounding individual rights and war takes place. As we 
proceed to the final section of this paper discussion returns to remotely piloted aircraft operations, 
examining how the application of the contrasting just war approaches of Walzer and McMahan – 
specifically their respective approaches to individual moral rights – significantly shapes any moral 
assessment of Reaper operations in Afghanistan. 
  
Morality and remote warfare 
Contrary to McMahan’s reading of Walzer and his analysis of who may or may not be legitimately 
attacked in war, Walzer’s just war theory does not permit the blanket killing of the innocent; he 
does, however, grant exceptions to his general prohibition on the killing of the ‘innocent’. For 
example, on grounds of ‘military necessity’51, if the avoidance of civilian deaths will present undue 
risk to the lives of combatants or to a militarily essential target. He describes this as ‘not a retained 
but a war right’.52 This ‘right’ to kill civilians in some situations is captured in international 
humanitarian law, with the Geneva Conventions prohibiting only attacks ‘which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
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thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’.53 
Assessing the competing rights located in noncombatant immunity, military necessity, and 
undue risk to the lives of combatant, involves a utilitarian calculation in which subjective bias will 
be all but impossible to avoid.
54
 The noncombatant will prefer an absolute right to life even if it 
renders military action impossible, while the military commander will prefer the maximum legal 
and moral room to manoeuvre (so to speak) when making operational decisions. The political 
leader, meanwhile, will often tend toward whichever of these two positions most serves their ends 
while minimising negative repercussions for themselves (as opposed to repercussions for the 
combatants or vulnerable noncombatants, though these factors may all be linked). Take the situation 
outlined earlier where a Reaper crew was legally authorised to attack a target but chose not to fire 
just in case an innocent bystander standing just out of their field of vision might be hit by the blast. 
It would be difficult for anyone to credibly argue that the crew acted in any way other than 
ethically. The context suggests that there was time to double-check that the prospective blast zone 
was clear before any subsequent attack.  
If, however, the Reaper attack had been time critical and a major military advantage would 
be lost without the immediate striking of the target – say, allowing a Taliban commander and 
several IED-makers
55
 to proceed with several waves of attack – the target could have legally be 
prosecuted: even if an innocent bystander was hit. In Walzer’s terms, such an act, even with the 
death of the noncombatant, could still be regarded as a moral action, especially viewed in utilitarian 
terms. In McMahan’s individual-rights approach, however, there are no circumstances in which an 
innocent bystander can lose their right to life: he refers to ‘the exceptionless prohibition of 
intentional attacks on civilians or noncombatants’.56 Therefore, the Reaper crew would be acting 
immorally if they fired a weapon knowing that it would likely cause a noncombatant’s death or 
grievous wounding: even if they achieved a significant military advantage for their allies in the 
process, and saved the lives of numerous other noncombatants who would otherwise be killed by 
IED and in other Taliban attacks.  
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One further factor to consider in this scenario is the political dimension. Each country’s 
ROE – where the military is legally constituted in a state context – are frequently designed to 
conform to both domestic law (of both the sending and the host country), and international 
humanitarian law in the shape of the Geneva Conventions. In an environment like Afghanistan in 
2013 it is feasible that ROE can be satisfied, a moral case for action can be made in terms of 
Walzer’s ‘military necessity’57 argument, and yet an attacking force – using the Reaper or another 
weapons platform – can choose not to engage. If Clausewitz’s maxim that war is a continuation of 
politics holds true (and I will grant here that it does), political leaders – for reasons of their own – 
may require or demand a level of noncombatant immunity that transcends the minimum required by 
ROE, the Geneva Conventions, or the moral permission granted in Walzer’s schema: zero civilian 
casualties. In effect, they would appear to be invoking McMahan’s absolutist position on the killing 
of the innocent. However, in reality their intentions and motivations would not be based on, or even 
associated with, McMahan’s moral claims about the importance of individual rights. A political 
intent could be prompted by a desire to avoid the deaths of innocents as a means of making it easier 
to negotiate the end of hostilities with an enemy. Less honourably, a political leader may simply 
wish to avoid negative newspaper headlines for reasons of personal or party-political advantage. In 
such a situation – and it is not difficult to imagine it arising – the moral imperative of the combatant 
is subsumed within higher political aims as jus in bello surrenders moral priority to jus post bellum. 
Perhaps the most potentially serious moral implication of invoking McMahan’s conception 
of individual moral rights-based just war is to be found in his rejection of key features of Walzer’s 
just war theory and the war convention more generally. McMahan rejects, for example, the notion 
that belonging to a particular group of combatants brings with it a liability to be attacked as well as 
the right to attack an identified and identifiable enemy. He writes: ‘My most serious concern about 
Walzer’s argument derives from his failure consistently to adhere to the rejection of group 
membership as a basis of liability to attack’.58 For McMahan, contra Walzer, membership of a 
particular group – the Royal Air Force, the US Army, the Taliban – does not in itself automatically 
grant to the enemy an inherent right to attack any member of that group in time of war. That is, if I 
am not threatening you or endangering your life then you have no right to threaten or endanger 
mine: ‘In short, if liability is a function of action and not membership, immunity must be a function 
of the absence of action and not of membership’.59  
There is one logical application of McMahan’s individual-focused just war reasoning that 
holds particular moral significance for individuals involved in remote operations, such as the RAF 
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Reaper crews based in the US or the UK who fly aircraft over Afghanistan. Namely, when a person 
is physically separated from the battlefield by thousands of miles and cannot be attacked by an 
enemy who is not equipped to do so. For McMahan, that person has no right to endanger an enemy 
combatant just because he belongs to the enemy’s army or militia: if I do not threaten you as an 
individual I must be immune to attack from you. Hence, using McMahan’s line of logical reasoning 
all remotely piloted aircraft operations against the Taliban
60
 in the Afghanistan theatre must, de 
facto, be immoral. Since the Reaper sensor operator in Creech Air Force Baser cannot – as things 
currently stand – be attacked by a member of the Taliban, then (according to McMahan) he or she 
can have no right to target and kill an enemy combatant who is a member of the Taliban.  
Returning to Walzer’s just war reasoning, and the relationship between the moral standing 
of combatants and the degree of risk they endure in carrying out their duties. It would appear, 
therefore, at least by focusing in the individual-rights aspect of Walzer’s just war, that the moral 
standing of Reaper pilots and sensor operators is problematic: the degree of risk they share in 
conducting operations is not equivalent to the risk endured by their targets or potential targets, or 
their allied ground combatants in the Afghanistan battle space. The lack of risk-bearing by Reaper 
crews suggests an imbalance in the individual-rights aspect of Walzer’s moral equation that weighs 
the combatant’s right to take the lives of others against the right to preserve his or her own life. 
However, to come to such a conclusion would be to overlook the crucial philosophical basis of 
Walzer’s just war outlined previously. For although individual rights – whether that be the right to 
take life or the right to preserve life – are a key feature of his moral framework, Walzer consistently 
sets those rights in the context of prioritised state rights and the rights of the military collective.  
As a result, the right of a Reaper sensor operator to kill a human target
61
 in Afghanistan does 
not rest solely or even primarily on his or her individual moral status as a combatant; that right rests 
in turn on the more important or higher order right of the state to defend itself and the (somehow) 
aggregated or collective moral rights of the individuals therein. Further, without the right to protect 
fellow combatants who are being attacked – for example, either using an artillery barrage from 
several miles away or using a Reaper from thousands of miles away to protect an Army patrol on 
the ground in Afghanistan – the very idea of a legitimate, collective state-sanctioned armed force 
descends into parody. Not every act on or around a battlefield can be reduced to, or legitimately 
called, an act of self-defence in an arena of equivalent risk. Examples of this asymmetry include 
firing long-range artillery against an enemy armed only with rifles, dropping bombs using 
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conventional aircraft on an enemy who has no air defences, or firing heavy guns or missiles from a 
ship against a target with no maritime capability. Further, it has been the aim of political leaders and 
military commanders since the dawn of time to achieve asymmetric advantage on the battlefield: the 
advent of the longbow achieved, at least temporarily, a tactical advantage no less significant than 
that provided by modern-day RPA. However, tactical asymmetry does not equate to moral 
asymmetry. It is a naïve reading of the history of warfare that equates chivalrous conduct to a desire 
for a ‘fair’ fight: generals and soldiers have always sought every advantage possible over an enemy 
determined to kill them. Individuals such as Reaper operators can and do operate as moral agents 
within a legitimate, sanctioned, state-centric moral framework of the type advocated by Walzer and 
which has dominated the just war tradition for centuries. The following personal account from a 
Reaper pilot – and it is worth quoting at length – demonstrates both the theory and practice of 
discriminating between combatants and noncombatants: 
 
I’ve had multiple strikes where waiting a little longer, or using the extra situational 
awareness tools in the Reaper have resulted in much better outcomes than you’d have got 
from a manned aircraft in the same setup. It happens almost every day.  My last flight 
involved working with [soldiers on the ground], who wanted us to provide some ISR
62
 on a 
hotly-contested area where they encounter a lot of IEDs and a lot of sporadic, harassing fire.  
We saw, before sunrise, a man leave a compound and go to an area behind a building.  He 
started digging, interacting with the ground.  The controller [on the ground] saw that and 
immediately suggested that it was an IED, and started trying to arrange permission for us to 
strike under the "hostile act" ROE.  His thinking was that there was a recent IED strike 
nearby, it was suspiciously before sunrise, and this was near an entryway to the compound, 
so probably a defensive IED.   
 
My crew disagreed, and as we watched longer and more closely, we could pick out some of 
the tools he was using and started to assess them as regular farming tools.  Eventually with 
the first fringes of sunrise, we could tell he was just seeding a small patch of ground.  
Watching him for an hour let us see that he had none of the hallmarks of a traditional IED 
emplacer; there was no rapidity, no hurry, no equipment, no lookout … I had a team inside 
the ops room I could talk to at length on the phone; second/third/fourth opinions available as 
required, and a feed that could be instantly stopped, rewound and reviewed to gather more 
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information. A manned aircraft with less equipment, less time, and a poorer camera would 
have almost certainly considered engaging [earlier].
63
 
 
 Discriminating between a legitimate target and an innocent civilian going about his business 
lies at the heart of this example. Far from making it easier or more convenient to kill a prospective 
target, the Reaper’s persistence and close-up view of events below enabled the crew to analyse what 
was happening in considerable detail and avoid an unnecessary death. Such caution challenges 
many ill-informed and oft-repeated assumptions about Reaper operations: the crew’s concerns 
prompted by a complex interplay of rules of engagement, commander’s intent, and a desire to act 
ethically at the extreme of human activity – killing another human. As one sensor operator summed 
up these three considerations: “Keeping the lawyers happy, the boss happy, and letting me sleep at 
night.”64 
 Walzer’s moral framework is far from perfect yet he still strives to allow the co-existence of 
moral agency and individual rights in complex military operations which are shaped by changing 
and sometimes unclear political constraints. In response to McMahan’s challenges in a number of 
areas, but particularly over the issue of assigning moral responsibility to individuals rather than 
collectives, Walzer writes the following: 
 
What Jeff McMahan means to provide ... is a careful and precise account of individual 
responsibility in time of war. What he actually provides, I think, is a careful and precise 
account of what individual responsibility in war would be like if war was a peacetime 
activity…I don’t deny [his] perceptiveness; I only want to deny its relevance to the 
circumstances of war.
65
 
 
Many who are steeped in military tradition might instinctively sympathise with Walzer’s 
sentiments here, recoiling from some of the impractical implications for future wars of McMahan’s 
ideas. This seems to be the concern of the UK Defence Secretary highlighted in the Introduction 
who said, ‘It can’t be right that troops on operations have to put the ECHR [European Convention 
on Human Rights] ahead of what is operationally vital to protect our national security.’66 However, 
they should not dismiss McMahan’s challenge out of hand: individual rights, in Europe at least, 
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continue to increase in prominence and the UK Supreme Court’s ruling on the rights of soldiers in 
an operational theatre must inevitably prompt further ethical debate. The final twist here could 
eventually be that the ‘gold standard’ for protecting the right to life of British soldiers on the 
battlefield requires the constant overhead presence of a Reaper, or its future derivative, during 
particularly dangerous engagements with the enemy. The irony of such an eventuality for those who 
judge the Reaper or other armed RPAS to be somehow inherently evil is that this means of 
delivering air power has – when used within proper legal constraints and governance structures –  
the capacity to protect human rights by being more discriminating in its targeting, and proportional 
in its use of force – in other words, more ethical – than any previous aircraft in the RAF’s 
inventory. 
 
Conclusion 
The advent of remotely piloted aircraft capable of delivering kinetic airpower has contributed 
significant new dimensions to the political, operational and moral dimensions of war, highlighting 
the asymmetry between enemy capabilities in Afghanistan and elsewhere. If the addition of Reaper 
to the UK’s military capability was viewed simply as an extension of the RAF’s inventory its use 
would be considered neither problematic nor controversial, and moral assessments could be based 
on normative just war assumptions. However, no weapon system has prompted more debate, 
opposition and speculation – usually uninformed speculation – since the nuclear controversies of 
the 1980s. In addition, the issue of the rights of individuals, legally and morally, has advanced 
apace over the past two decades, in Europe at least. It has hopefully become clear in the course of 
this article that much more nuanced and probing analysis of the moral dimension of remotely 
piloted aircraft operations is needed, with the significance of individual rights-based moral 
arguments being paid particular attention. The UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond voiced 
serious concerns about the impact of the legal application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights to military operations. A parallel shift in emphasis in the moral arguments surrounding war 
from state-centric to individually focused would have significant consequences for the moral 
component of fighting power as currently understood in the UK and by most of its Western allies – 
especially with the advent and use of remote technologies. The notion of morally justified collective 
action of the type currently undertaken by NATO partners in Afghanistan may be significantly or 
fatally undermined: a danger acknowledged by the Supreme Court. Military practitioners and 
scholars of military practice ignore societal developments at their peril. How many in the military 
and academic communities, as little as 15 years ago, would have predicted that the European 
Convention on Human Rights would be successfully applied to British soldiers on a battlefield in 
Iraq? The survival of the just war tradition for almost two millennia (longer, depending on where 
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you start it) has depended on its ability to adapt and remain relevant when making moral 
assessments about war in changing political, military, technological and cultural landscapes. Its 
relevance to war should no more be seen as definitive, fixed and timeless than the contributions of 
the longbow, gunpowder, the Spitfire or nuclear weapons. Similarly, the relevance of individual 
rights to just war theory would appear to be growing in significance and should be maintained as an 
object of ongoing ethical enquiry. 
 
 
